Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes)
Volume 42

Number 2

Article 11

Summer 1999

The Individual, the Community, and Physician-Assisted Suicide
Peter J. Hammer
University of Michigan Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes

Recommended Citation
Peter J. Hammer, The Individual, the Community, and Physician-Assisted Suicide, 42 Law Quadrangle
(formerly Law Quad Notes) - (1999).
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/lqnotes/vol42/iss2/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Law Quadrangle (formerly Law Quad Notes) by an authorized
editor of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
mlaw.repository@umich.edu.

84

THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL

This excerpt is adapted from the upcoming book
Physician-Assisted Suicide, to be published in
October 2000 and copyrighted by University of

Michigan Press. The forthcoming book, edited
and with an introduction by Professor of Law
Carl E. Schneider, '79, incorporates papers
delivered at the conference "Courting Death: A
Constitutional Right to Suicide," held at the Law
School in November 1997. The conference was
devoted to fallow-up discussion of two decisions
in summer 1997 in which the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the right to physician-assisted
suicide, Washington v. Glucksberg 117 S Ct
2258 (1997), and Vacco v. Quill 117 S Ct 2293
(1 997). The following excerpt appears with
permission from University of Michigan Press.

The conflict surrounding assisted suicide is symptomatic of a profound
disequilibrium in the way society faces death and dying. The sources of this
imbalance are many. Technology has drastically changed the physical setting in
which dying occurs, forcing us to formulate new understandings of life and death.
What it means to be alive or to be dead is no longer clear, nor is the exact moment
of passage. The structure of modem medicine further contributes to the imbalance:
As health care has become more institutionalized, specialized, and routinized, so

has dying. Machines regulate and control life and death, maintaining heartbeats
and breaths, reducing a person to a series of vital signs. Life is meted out and
measured, regulated and controlled Quantity, defined in hours, days, and years,
often displaces quality as the objective to be pursued Grieving and burial have also
been reduced to commodities by a funeral industry equally committed to masking
the real face of death. At the same time, the families and communities responsible
for nurturing life and consoling death have been severely strained. Family
structures at the nuclear and extended levels have become more fractured, and our
circle of immediate friends and loved ones has become more geographically
dispersed As a consequence, death is often faced alone in a cold, technical
environment, divorced from family and friends, surrounded by strangers.

The problem ot assisted suicide torces us
to carefully assess the meaning of death and
dying (and by implication the meaning of
life and living). This assessment is hard
because death typically provokes more fear
and denial than contemplation and
reflection. The fear is of the unknown, of
pain, suffering, and debility. The denial of
death can be motivated as much by a sense
of emptiness in life as by an actual fear of
dying - or perhaps by a heightened fear of
death because of a felt incompleteness in
life. Still, it is clear that death retains an
importance and significa~ce that is as
profound as it is unavoidable. Death is a
stage in life holding many of its own
lessons. Moreover, the manner in which
death must be faced can influence the
choices made during life, just as how we
live will have implications for the manner
in which we die. Death can bring us back
to a sense of community, both by coalescing
a group that provides support and comfort
and by bringing to the fore the legacy we
will leave behind, a legacy often defined in
terms of the contributions we have made to
others.
In our passive acquiescence to the
medicalization of death and dying, it is not
only death that is being denied. There is a
denial of life. There is a denial of the
individual as an integrated being. There is a
denial of meaning and human dignity.
Finally, there is a denial of community. Add
to this the reality of individual human
suffering, pain, disability, and dementia,
and it is easy to see how recourse to suicide
may look individually rational. While
substantial attention has been paid to the
role of pain in decisions on whether to
commit suicide, similar attention has not
been paid to the role of community. The
issue is whether suicide is, for some, an
individually rational response to death or
an individually rational response to the way
people are presently living and dying. The
movement for assisted suicide may be
symptomatic of larger problems in society
and an indictment of the absence of
meaningful community. Ironically, ratifying
a right to assisted suicide and recognizing
the ascendancy of the I-for-me rationality at
the end of life may be the ultimate step in
commodifying life and death and may
further shift the balance away from the
community and toward the increasingly
isolated individual.
As the assisted suicide debate moves
from the courthouse to the statehouse, we
must re-examine the arguments that
surround it to determine which elements
are essential and which might bend in
establishing a network of coexisting beliefs.
LAW QUADRANGLE NOTES SUMMER
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The I-for-me perspectives of the plaintiffs in

Glucksburg (Washington v. Glucksberg, 117 S
Ct 2258 [1997]) and Quill (Vacca v. Quill
117 S Ct 2293 [1997]) highlight the
importance of respecting individual
autonomy and self-determination,
particularly as these qualities relate to
engendering an appropriate sense of
personal dignity and control in the face of
death. Moreover, the reality of the pain and
suffering experienced by these individuals
must be directly confronted. The we-for-me
arguments of opponents of assisted suicide
remind us that the scope of individual
autonomy and self-determination is
necessarily circumscribed in the presence of
defects in individual decision making, and
that it is appropriate to place limits on
personal choice when those choices have
adverse effects on third persons. The wefor-us perspectives highlight the fact that
the community is a collective entity with its
own needs and interests. There are times
when these collective interests may
legitimately trump those of the individual.
The community, however, must also be
sensitive to the growth, development, and
self-actualization of its members.
While there are positive aspects to these
viewpoints, there are shortcomings to each
perspective as well. The plaintiffs' claims in
Glucksberg and Quill are arresting, but they
have limitations. If we ask the dying why
they consider suicide, they frequently speak
of pain and suffering. But a number of
other themes also emerge. One is a desire
for control, another a desire for dignity.
While the desire for control is understandable,
the important question is what type of
control is appropriate and how that control
should be manifested.
Proponents of assisted suicide argue for
control in the form of being able to
individually determine the moment and
manner of death. This is the type of control
of a Hollywood director, a film editor, or
Ronald Dworkins author writing her lifes
last chapter. (R. Dworkin, Life's Dominion:

An Argument about Abortion, Euthanasia, and
Individual Freedom, Knopf, 1993). This is
not the only type of individual control that
can be envisioned. Being ill and dying
entails an inevitable loss of control. That
loss is compounded when doctors expect
passive compliance with their expertise and
authority. But while many aspects of dying
are beyond human control, numerous other
aspects are not. Individual control can be
manifested in many ways short of assisted
suicide. Letting people participate in what
they can affect is one way for them to assert
control and to assuage feelings of
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helplessness and anxiety. Participation can
help people distinguish those parts of dying
that are controllable from those that are not,
and help them to accept the inevitable loss
of control they have over their bodies and
existence. Dying must involve an
appropriate combination of taking charge
and letting go, engagement, and resignation.
Just as the desire for control requires a
balanced understanding of what can and
cannot be influenced, so the desire for
dignity requires an understanding and
acceptance of different forms of
dependence. In our culture, dignity is often
defined in terms of independence and selfsufficiency A common fear among the
dying is of becoming dependent upon
others. Put bluntly but succinctly - "I
want to be able to wipe my own butt."
While every one can empathize with this
sentiment, "dignity" need not be
understood that way. Infants do not lack
dignity because they need their diapers
changed, nor must changing them be
burdensome. Dignity is inherently a
relational concept, defining the person with
respect to her community. Illness and dying
are necessarily an assault on self-sufficiency,
a reminder of ones vulnerability, weakness,
and dependence. As illness physically
changes the person, it calls for a continual
redefinition of ones self and of ones sense
of dignity.
Confronting incapacity while retaining a
sense of self-worth is like accepting loss of
control over the uncontrollable and yet
remaining engaged and retaining control of
the dying process. A static image of self and
concepts of dignity defined solely in terms
of strength, independence, and autonomy
are ill-suited to prepare a person for a
protracted illness or prolonged death.
Justice Stevens speaks poignantly about
peoples interest in influencing the memories
they will leave behind, but no life is a
snapshot. A life is a complex story, with
many chapters and phases. Just as the
concern about memories is a concern about
how others see us, so the concern over
dignity is at its heart a fear that our inability
to accept the loss of our independence and
our control over our bodies will be shared
by others. Feelings of indignity are largely
fears of rejection by our community. Such
fears not only invite, but demand, a
communal response.
It is interesting but not surprising to
note how tracing the individuals interest in
maintaining personal dignity has necessarily
led us from viewing the individual in
isolation to understanding the individual as
a member of a community. Other emotions

and fears surrounding death - such as
fears of abandonment and feelings of
isolation - confirm that it is impossible to
speak of the dying individual without also
speaking of the living community. The
individual and society are intimately
interconnected. The decisions of family,
friends, and the community will affect the
environment in which death occurs and the
levels of fear, anxiety, and meaning that are
present. Coming to terms with death
requires coming to tei;ms with ones self and
ones community. A discourse focusing
exclusively upon individual autonomy and
I-for-me rationality is insufficient unless the
concept of self it engenders leads the
individual back to a sense of community.
The presence, attitudes, and actions of
family and friends, of doctors and nurses,
and healthcare providers will have as much
to do with finding dignity and meaning in
death as the medical condition of the
dying person.
This criticism is not limited to I-for-me
perspectives. Similar deficiencies can be
found in the we-for-me policy arguments
raised by opponents of assisted suicide.
Rather than addressing the central issue of
the individuals relationship to the
community and the communitys
obligations to its members, opponents focus
on decision defects and slippery-slope
concerns. These are surely important, but at
another level they are simply distractions,
for they do not address the human
dimension of the dying persons needs or
the overall needs of society. Worse, these
arguments are frequently a pretext to
camouflage a debate that is really about
social norms. Those favoring a strong norm
in favor of the sanctity of life often invoke
substantial and irremediable decisionmaking defects and a steep and inescapable
slippery slope. Their opponents deprecate
these concerns. The failure to address the
central conflict between individual and
collective rationality is not only
disingenuous, it is self-defeating. Decisiondefect and slippery-slope arguments involve
contested, empirical claims. Empirical
claims invite emprical resolution. Debate
will inevitably drift toward "how" to
regulate and not "whether" to regulate. In
this process, a right to assisted suicide
could too easily be adopted incrementally
without openly addressing the underlying
normative concerns.
We-for-us arguments face their own
challenges and limitations. The concern
over the sanctity of life can delegitimate
itself if pursued so oppressively that it robs
individual lives of their meaning. Any
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authentic communal value must resonate in
a consonant fashion with the needs of its
individual members. The sanctity of life
cannot be a wooden or artificial principle.
To address these concerns, the Ninth
Circuit advocated using a sliding scale
standard to assess the value of life (in
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 850 F
Supp 1454 [WD Wash 19941): "[Elven
though the protection of life is one of the
state's most important functions, the states
interest is dramatically diminished if the
person it seeks to protect is terminally ill or
permanently comatose and has expressed a
wish that he be permitted to die without
further medical treatment. ... When
patients are no longer able to pursue liberty
or happiness and do not wish to pursue
life, the states interest in forcing them to
remain alive is clearly less compelling."
Unfortunately, this analysis raises its own
slippery-slope concerns. If the socially
determined value of a life diminishes as
people near death, how will the debates
over voluntary and involuntary euthanasia,
or the rationing of healthcare be affected?
Eroding or chipping away at the intrinsic
value society attaches to the lives of its
individual members can have profound and
disturbing consequences. The use of a
sliding scale in which the value of a life is
worth less depending on its objective
circumstances motivates the opposition to
the legalization of assisted suicide of many
associations of handicapped and disabled
people. In fairness to the Ninth Circuit, the
court tries to make the sliding scale depend
upon the dying person herself. The
distinction between the individuals
assessment of her lifes value and societys
assessment, however, is difficult to maintain
as a practical matter and almost impossible
to implement as a matter of policy. To be
given legal effect, the individuals evaluation
must ultimately be ratified by the state.
If the sliding-scale valuation of human
life is not a good way to prevent a rigid
version of the sanctity of life from burdening
the dying, how should collective concerns
over the intrinsic value of life be tailored to
address the needs of the terminally ill? A
policy that can provide a satisfactory answer
to this question will effectively mediate and
potentially resolve the tensions between
individual and collective rationality that
divide camps in the assisted suicide debate.
While I do not claim to have a definitive
answer to this question, a satisfactory
resolution would seem to minimally include
the following elements.

First, an acknowledgement that a necessary
corollary to the sanctity of life is the value of
compassion. A society that claims to respect
the intrinsic value of life is obligated to
respond compassionately to the physical
and emotional needs of its dying members,
including the use of aggressive palliative
care when necessary to ameliorate
individual pain and suffering. Respect
for the sanctity of life without the
corresponding value of compassion can
become a hollow and potentially
oppressive principle.

Second, development of an appropriate
vocabulary to operationalize the principles
associated with preserving the sanctity of life in
order to help guide the making of end-of-life
decisions. I often prefer speaking of a
"reverence for life" rather than the "sanctity"
or "intrinsic value" of life, and
operationalizing this principle by requiring
that individual decisions be life-affirming.
Choice of terminology, however, should not
obscure the fact that life must remain an
end in itself, and that end-of-life decisions
should be made in accordance with this
principle. The danger in the Ninth Circuits
sliding scale and in efforts to adopt a
"quality of life" rhetoric is that both can too
easily slip in directions that fail to respect
life as its own end. A rhetoric grounded in
reverence for life and a requirement that
end-of-life decisions be life-affirming helps
avoid this trap, and yet should be capable
of acknowledging that the object of life and
medicine is not simply the preservation of a
series of vital signs.

Third, encouraging individual selfdetermination and empowering individuals to
exercise control over their lives and medical
care within a dominant ethic of reverence for
life, including reverence for their own lives.
Individuals should be permitted to
structure a substantial range of end-of-life
alternatives, including alternatives other
than dying in an institutionalized medical
setting. While I would empower greater
individual autonomy in making end-of-life
decisions, I would deny the individual the
option of suicide on the ground that such
an act is not life-affirming and fails to
respect the intrinsic value of life that should
be symmetrically held by the individual
and society.
Although approaching the problem from
a substantially different perspective, these
principles are in general accord with the
Supreme Courts results in Cruzan v.
Director, Missouri Dept. of Health 497 US
261 (1990) and Glucksberg. Individuals are
provided substantial freedom in denying
unwanted medical care, and yet are also
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Death is undeniably
an important stage in

life, potentially no less
signific,ant than other
development stages such as
d1ildhood and adolescence.
Death and dying may
ajford une>.pected
opportunities and lessons
for each of us, lessons that
would be lost ifdea,th is
short circuited or denied
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denied the right to assisted suicide. The
extension of choice in one area and the
denial of choice in another may appear
contradictory, but it underlies an important
paradox. Sometimes the exercise of
individual freedom can be realized only in
the presence of external constraints. The
freedom is the ability to actively shape and
influence the manner in which death and
dying occur. The constraint is the
prohibition of suicide. The individual and
the community may be better able to
negotiate the delicate balances these
decisions require if they do so within a
setting in which both the individual and the
state share a mutual commitment to the
sanctity of human life.
But what of the challenge of I-for-us
reasoning? Is a norm prohibiting suicide
but expressly acknowledging society5
obligation for compassionate palliative care
and otherwise permitting individuals
substantial self-determination in making
life-affirming end-of-life decisions consistent
with the dictates of I-for-us rationality7
Could that norm be embraced by the
plaintiffs in Glucksberg and Quill not
necessarily as a matter of individual
rationality, but as part of what they could
think of as collectively rationaP Justification
for such a norm could come from two
sources. First are the aspirational arguments
in favor of a symmetric commitment to the
sanctity of life as an essential aspect of our
definition of society If these arguments
present a persuasive picture of how we
conceive of ourselves and our community,
then a norm prohibiting assisted suicide
could fall within the category of I-for-us
norms essential to the survival and integrity
of the community The arguments against
the sliding-scale value of life suggest some
of the dangers associated with failing to
embrace such a norm.
The second possible justification would
be in terms of norms designed to facilitate
individual development. A norm against
assisted suicide could be justified if dying,
like primary education, is an important
developmental stage in life - a stage that is
capable of substantively transforming
individual preferences and beliefs. Death is
undeniably an important stage in life,
potentially no less significant than other
development stages such as childhood and
adolescence. Death and dying may afford
unexpected opportunities and lessons for
each of us, lessons that would be lost if
death is short circuited or denied. This
contention is not limited to the lessons
inherent in the dying process. Equally
important is the fact that knowledge of how

we must face death can filter back and
influence decisions throughout our lives.
Moreover, it is not only the dying who learn
through death. The actions and decisions
we make in dying teach those around us,
particularly members of our family, about
life and death.
If these I-for-us arguments are not
persuasive, then the issue of assisted suicide
is reduced to a set of empirical questions
regarding the significance of various
we-for-me concerns. Appropriate policy
should then be based upon the assessments
of state legislators about the pervasiveness
of individual decision defects and the
seriousness of potential slippery slope
problems. The significance of resolving the
debate in this manner, however, should not
be lost. Assisted suicide raises important
constitutive questions. Rejecting the
aspiration arguments in favor of the sanctity
of life involves the adoption of a different
set of aspirational claims and beliefs that
will equally define us as a society My point
is that in making constitutive decisions that
will define who we are, we should collectively
pause and give careful consideration to who
we want to be.
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